[2025–2026] Week 11: John Train's The New Money Masters
Reading assignment and questions for week 11 of the Value Investing Seminar
(Note: If you are just joining the seminar, please start by reading the Introduction)
One of the most important factors in Warren Buffett’s success is his ability to evolve. Had he stayed a pure disciple of Benjamin Graham, it is likely that his returns would have been a pale shadow of his actual record.
Why?
Two reasons. First of all, the markets changed over time, and with them the opportunities available to investors. The net-nets that Graham is so famous for largely disappeared, and if an investor insisted on largely restricting themselves to them they would not do nearly as well as they might have in Graham’s days.
The second reason is that even though Graham was an amazing investor, he did not possess all the investing wisdom out there. Buffett recognized that, in part through experience and in part through the influence of Charlie Munger and Philip Fisher.
As much as Buffett successfully evolved, it is important to note the ways in which he hasn’t changed. Despite the crowds of people running around paying very fancy prices for good businesses, he has resisted that temptation. He still insists on both high business/management quality and a good margin of safety in terms of the gap between price and his conservative estimate of intrinsic value.
This is all the more ironic since his most-misused quote, the one about “buying great companies at a fair price rather than fair companies at a great price,” has led many others to deviate from what Buffett actually does and to frequently overpay.
In that regard, as in many others, one of Buffett’s greatest assets and a big reason for his success is near-infinite patience. He is much more comfortable doing nothing for uncomfortably long periods of time than most investors. That temperament is as big an explanation for his amazing results as his actual process, intelligence or experience.
Perhaps that’s why, for all the multitudes quoting and trying to copy Buffett, there hasn’t been anyone who has come even close?
Regarding Question 1 James wrote: “The similarities were that the approach of a margin of safety, and not paying too much. Looking out for value and special opportunities with convertible shares, and underpriced bonds continued to feature in the new vehicle.
The differences were in the long term approach for shareholdings, buying things “forever” and assessing their potential on that basis. The increasing preference for buying whole businesses, both for tax efficiency, and management control. The expansion of insurance as a way of gathering funds for further investment at a very low cost of capital. This is by its nature a very long term game, but the cashflow profile is the best in any industry anywhere.
Purchases are seen for their “lookthrough value” meaning the share of underlying earnings being bought by an investment, regardless of whether it was being paid out as a dividend, used for stock purchases or held for further internal investment. He concentrated on growing this value at least 15%, with the view that the stock market would eventually reward him by valuing these earnings on a decent multiple, and not caring very much as a low stock price enabled him to buy more earnings power for a lower cost. His line is that only “Disinvestors” benefit from high prices, as they are the ones who want to sell. Everyone else should be happy. In the partnership years he would be selling when the price reached his target to reward his Partners.”
Regarding Question 2 Navin wrote: “Similarities : Buffett always sought a margin of safety and mispriced opportunities; the underlying discipline of buying below intrinsic value persisted even as the type of business he bought changed. Concentration and long term mindset etc.
Differences : In the later days, he favored durable competitive advantages and predictable cash flows , probably a shift strongly influenced by Charlie Munger’s emphasis on quality over bargain price
In the 1980 shareholder letter Buffett explained that when he found attractive opportunities he would borrow at high rates (around 12%) to increase purchasing power accepting the interest cost because the expected return on the investments justified it.”
Regarding Question 3 James wrote: “Despite my comments below he was remarkably good at finding exceptional businesses with exceptional management and retaining both for decades of strong performance.
GEICO: Happily it was his very first investment as a sign of things to come. It was a remarkable investment because it both generated massive funds as float, and was so competitive that it also generated a very good profit as well. This kind of double return was one of his most effective ploys, and is very hard to find in the world. Only one other comes to mind: It was one of the reasons that being a Name at Lloyds of London was so lucrative for so long, your investments earned money as investments, and collected underwriting profits from their collateral role as well. Many of the names collected their two checks for one set of capital every year between the mid 1960’s and the mid 1980’s without ever being called on to payout on a claim during the whole 20 years. Alas the late 80’s saw huge claims, followed by the collapse of the system. It failed to work very well when the money was actually needed, and the Corporation itself had to rescue the worse hit syndicates and names.”
Regarding Question 4 J. Rupert wrote: “- Dexter Shoe: Banked on the longevity of producing a single product that could be produced by cheaper labor offshore. I still wonder if this was lack of attention to changing global landscape and its effects.
- General Reinsurance: Although it resolved, this was a time eater, complicated and messy. Not sure he would have bought it if he had been more aware of the complicated derivatives.”
Note: With the holidays coming up, the next assignment will not be due in a week, but rather in 3 weeks, on Thursday, January 8th. I will plan to post assignment 12 on Friday, January 9th, but if you want to get a head start on the reading it will be based on ‘Adam Smith’s’ The Money Game.
Week 11 assignment is to read John Train’s The New Money Masters and answer the following questions:
Question 1: For each investor, map them on as many dimensions of an investment style as you can.
Question 2: Who is your favorite investor, and why?
Question 3: Least favorite, and why?
Question 4: Come up with an AI prompt based on any of the investors that you have read about in the book.
Happy Holidays to you and your families!
Now it’s your turn:
Submit your answers in the comments below this article with all your answers in a single comment. I will engage with some of the answers each week and highlight some of the ones I find most insightful in next week’s seminar assignment article.
Engage with the answers of some of your fellow seminar members in the comments below. Remember – the goal is to learn together. Be kind, be respectful and try to add to our learning as a community.
Feel free to ask any questions about the reading in your comment.
Until next year,
Gary
About the author
Gary Mishuris, CFA is the Managing Partner and Chief Investment Officer of Silver Ring Value Partners, an investment firm that seeks to apply its intrinsic value approach to safely compound capital over the long-term. He also teaches the Value Investing Seminar at the F.W. Olin Graduate School of Business.





Q1 :
Jim Rogers
• Orientation: Top-down (macro, countries)
• Asset Focus: Commodities, currencies, equities
• Valuation Lens: Supply-demand cycles, monetary cycles
• Risk Approach: Contrarian, cautious, Own research. Doesnt like inside information
• Decision Drivers: Macro trends, currency convertibility, liquidity
• Others : Tax agnostic
Michael Steinhardt
• Orientation: Opportunistic trader
• Time Horizon: Short carving out little gains — 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent
• Asset Focus: Equities, macro trades
• Risk Approach: Aggressive, tactical
• Decision Drivers: Market psychology
• Portfolio Construction: Long short , tactical rotation
Philip Caret
• Orientation: Bottom-up fundamental
• Time Horizon: Long-term
• Asset Focus: Mid/large-cap equities
• Valuation Lens: Balance sheet strength (low D/E, high current ratio)
• Risk Approach: Conservative
• Decision Drivers: Fundamentals, Mgmt, favorable regulatory climate
• Portfolio Construction: Diversified
George Soros
• Orientation: Macro reflexive
• Time Horizon: Agnostic. Eg- “Four years is a long time to be under water!”
• Asset Focus: Currencies, global equities
• Valuation Lens: Reflexivity, perception-driven
• Risk Approach: Aggressive, contrarian
• Decision Drivers: Reflexivity cycles, regulatory shifts, psychology
• Portfolio Construction: Concentrated, high conviction
George Michaelis
• Orientation: Bottom-up
• Time Horizon: Long-term ; “You must invest with the one hundred-year storm in mind”
• Asset Focus: Equities
• Valuation Lens: ROE/ROA focus, earnings power
• Risk Approach: Low risk ; Always has excess liquidity ; min 10%
• Decision Drivers: Fundamental profitability drivers, Cash generation
• Portfolio Construction: Buy-and-hold, selective.
John Neff
• Orientation: Value man . Bottom-up
• Time Horizon: Long-term
• Asset Focus: Equities (income focus) ; "low-P/E shooter."
• Valuation Lens: Low P/E, dividends, cash flow
• Risk Approach: Conservative, disciplined
• Decision Drivers: Company fundamentals, dividend certainty
• Portfolio Construction: Concentrated , patient, disciplined exits. “hurdle rate”
Ralph Wanger
• Orientation: Bottom-up
• Time Horizon: Long-term
• Asset Focus: Small-cap growth
• Valuation Lens: Trend leadership
• Risk Approach: Opportunistic
• Decision Drivers: Sectoral growth trends
• Portfolio Construction: Diversified across small firms
Peter Lynch
• Orientation: Hybrid (growth + value)
• Time Horizon: Long-term
• Asset Focus: Equities (all categories)
• Valuation Lens: GARP, special situations, cyclicals
• Risk Approach: Pragmatic
• Decision Drivers: Company fundamentals, “invest in what you know”
• Portfolio Construction: Broadly diversified (hundreds of stocks)
Q2:
It would be Peter Lynch for the following reasons
• Lynch’s “invest in what you know” principle helps inspire ordinary investors like myself to leverage everyday observations & then build from there.
• He blended growth and value (GARP: Growth At a Reasonable Price), which makes his approach adaptable across market cycles.
• Lynch ran a massively diversified portfolio (hundreds of stocks) yet still delivered outsized returns. They way he hustled to run such a big PF is an inspiration by itself.
• From this book , I learnt that
o Less than 5 percent of Lynch's trades are bigger than 10,000 shares.
o in a matter of weeks had sunk 3 percent of Magellan's capital in LaQuinta
o Insider tips never worked, M&A Rumours never worked (i.e) "the sizzle, not the steak," as he says — and again he will bite, and again he will lose.
o Lynch looks particularly at unit growth, even more than earnings growth
o "The very best way to make money in a market is in a small growth company that has been profitable for a couple of years and simply goes on growing" says Lynch.
o The stock Lynch says he most wants to avoid is the hottest stock in the hottest industry — the one that gets the most favourable publicity, that every investor is told about by other investors
o His dream, he says, somewhat surprisingly, is the growth company in a slow-growth industry: You know something has to be profoundly right about the situation
o "I don't care whether the stocks are going up, down, sideways." There is, however, one exception: catching the turn. That maneuver attracts Lynch strongly
o "if a company has a good balance sheet when I buy it, that gives me a big edge. If it doesn't turn around I can perhaps lose a third of what I invest. But if it does turn around, then I can do very well indeed."
Q3: Michael Steinhardt represents the super trader’s archetype.. His mantra was “you never make big money without getting in the way of danger.” He deliberately positioned himself where volatility and risk were highest, believing that’s where outsized gains could be carved.
Q1:
Google Doc Table -- https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vSXtz739obvbOWzNSrAarnZlJXmpiQmMpfS6h0X-iagGks0TilewKFOOJj8bY7JOtn7FP18uWDic_en/pub
Q2:
It's a tough call among Carret, Wanger and Michaelis, but I like Michaelis the best. His approach was business-focused, low risk, practical, and tolerant of lagging the market averages. He was patient. Many of his criteria for identifying good companies reminded one of Fisher. He didn't rely on rigid formulas but built on the sustainable 'whys' of success. I like his method of monitoring a group of interesting companies, even if they weren't currently at the right price, so that he was prepared to act when opportunities arose. His approach has aspects I can model.
Q3:
Michael Steinhardt was my least favorite, followed by Soros and most of the other traders/speculators. Trading at the frequency that he did ('innumerable transactions') seems like a consuming, breakneck way to make money, leaving little room for other meaningful activities. Using borrowed money as leverage is not appealing to me, and trying to make profit by shorting failing companies feels like the opposite of investing (building/growing something). He didn't conduct most of his own research but paid others to do it for him, and he didn't seem to take an interest in understanding businesses. Although he did have some good tips, there's not much in his approach I want to model.
Q4:
I had two variations for idea generation based on Wanger. In one I used an industry I’m familiar with and the other I left broad. I added the odds of the catalyst happening to see what the AI put weight on (it leaned optimistic on all of them, so that might not really be of value).
Use Wanger's approach of looking for companies that benefit from changing trends. Identify the changing trends in NAME OF INDUSTRY. For each relevant trend, compile a list of promising companies that fill support roles.
Or
Identify unrelated macro or micro trends across demographics, consumer behavior, logistics, energy systems, materials science, healthcare, climate adaptation, regulatory shifts, digital infrastructure, and global economic realignment. AI may be included as only one trend.
For each trend:
1. Explain the trend in 2–4 sentences, and why or why not it is durable over a multi‑year horizon.
2. Identify 3–5 companies that play support, enabling, or infrastructure roles (not the obvious headline disruptors).
3. For each company, provide a structured assessment with:
- Investment Thesis
- Bear Case Catalysts, Bull Case Catalysts and Odd of each in next 5 yrs
Prioritize companies with:
• strong balance sheets
• durable competitive advantages
• multi‑year growth potential
• low hype exposure
• business models that benefit from the trend but do not depend on perfect execution
Avoid herd behavior by excluding:
• over‑crowded AI names (unless they solidly check all the boxes)
• meme stocks
• speculative biotech
• unprofitable early‑stage companies