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James's avatar

Thank you for running this course, I like to have my thinking challenged, and the first question did just that. Here is my list. It made me consider how useful, objective and valid each investment approach is, and which go together well, or not so well, with others.

Dimension Measurement

Diversification Correlation Matrix

Research Research Depth

Volatility VIX, Standard deviation

Quality Custom list of metrics

Momentum % Change in price

Arbitrage Price difference

Special situations value gap, risk

Risk management Sharp Ratio/VaR

Chart shape, technical analysis custom chart formations

Scuttlebutt – networking Non-public information

Activity custom measurement

Growth historical and projected growth

Size Market Cap

Sector Sector exposure %

Value NAV, PE

Income Dividend yield

Time Horizon Average investment time period

Ethics Custom list of metrics

Contrarian % change in price

Volume Trading volume

Skin in the game % Director ownership

Geographical % geographical exposure

A few things that stood out as I looked at the list

Some approaches cluster other approaches strongly:

Short time horizon clusters with Volatility, Momentum, Arbitrage, Volume and technical analysis.

Long time horizon clusters with Research, Quality, Growth, Value, Skin in the game

Others are always important whatever style you use:

Risk Management, diversification

Some are easy to measure and objective, so you can more likely assume they are "in the price":

Size, sector, value, income

Some the whole point is that they are not generally known:

Scuttlebutt information, non listed activities like retailers car park usage, or electricity use by measuring pylon temperature

Some are subjective or estimates, and therefore subject to interpretation and bias:

Quality, Ethics, Contrarian, Research, Special situations, growth

Question 1

it was written in 1934 with Dodds on the basis of his lectures at Colombia from 1928 to 1932 and his experiences in Wall St from 1914 when he graduated. Most people then regarded stocks as gambling, bonds were considered the only safe and respectable investment. Stocks were mostly bought on tips, especially driven by the activity of stock market pools that drove prices both up and down by corners and squeezes. He made his first great win in 1915 by a value play based on the now simple idea that 1 share of Guggenheim Exploration held about 10% more value in listed securities and other assets that it owned.

Question 2

His investment philosophy was of a "margin of safety" using analysis to evaluate the intrinsic value of a share based on it's fundamentals. A long track record of success is necessary and a very high margin of safety for growth projections. The market is not always efficient and this can be used to create value for the patient and disciplined investor.

Question 3

I consider this approach and knowledge necessary but not sufficient. It is always essential to understand accounts, to understand the risks you are taking on fundamentals, and how large they are, and to conduct your own analysis. Much of the information and the approach is timeless: people don't change, and neither do calculations of fundamental value. But some things do change. For example:

The information that Graham had to calculate himself is now generally easily available

The change in technology means that moats and competitive advantage are now both greater and give much larger returns in some cases.

The rise in market multiples make it hard to find good quality candidates with an adequate margin of safety

private equity (who did not exist in those days) frequently buys value plays in smaller companies for relatively modest premiums, resulting in significant losses for mistimed value purchases. Where I live in the UK this is a very common experience.

The greatly increased costs of employing top management talent, of professional advice, and listing of companies, can rapidly erode margins of safety in smaller companies, and significantly dent those in larger ones.

My biggest problem with a pure value approach is the intellectual objection that it always biased towards buying the cheapest companies not the best ones. And cheap does not work. Too often the company is cheap for good reason, and you only find out the reason after you have bought it. Management and sophisticated insiders always know more than you do and accounts are always backwards looking. Value investors often try and fudge this by applying "quality" measures, and other criteria, but this is both subjective, and also a tacit admission of the inadequacy of a wholly value approach.

Question 4

Invest only when there is a significant gap between intrinsic value and market price. Anything else is mere speculation.

Byron's avatar

Q0: Question 0: Come up with as many other dimensions of an investing style as you can and provide a scale for each of those dimensions (e.g. Diversification [high to low])

I looked at this form the perspective of asset class, which might not be correct, but some other dimensions might be:

Stocks/bonds, options or derivatives/equities, equities/ real estate, equities, commodities/cash, private credit/commercial credit etc this can be somewhat infinite. And From Graham “price and terms” (see below q2)

Other dimensions from Sec Analysis:

Investment : speculation

• Bonds/stocks

• Outright purchases/purchases on margin

• For permanent holdings/for a quick turn

• For income / for profit

• In safe securities / in risky issues

Question 1: When did Graham write the first edition of Security Analysis and how did the environment during which he was operating and writing influence his work?

I am referencing the 7th Edition of Security Analysis and what a wonderful edition it is, with Seth Klarman and a host of masters writing essays as preludes to each part.

1934 was edition 1 in depth of the depression, with many excellent examples of businesses going bust allowing him to hone his principles based on companies that survived.

Question 2: What’s Graham’s investment philosophy? Why does he think that’s best?

I interpret his philosophy as: Know the difference between an investment and a speculation, know thyself and circumstances; are you an untrained individual investor, analyst, money manager or trustee, are you investing your own or others’ money are you buying outright or on margin? Understand time; your time horizon and the impact of time and base your decisions on quantitive and qualitative factors, based of facts. In Grahams words:

“Instead of asking, (1) in what security? And (2) at what price? Let us ask (1) in what enterprise and (2) on what terms” p81 is a simple way of understanding Graham’s philosophy because he establishes clear dimensions for the reader/analyst and sets out 2 principles: “

1. Principle for the untrained security buyer: do not put money in a low-grade enterprise on any terms.

2. Principle for the securities analyst: Nearly every issue might conceivably be cheap in one price range and dear in another” p84.

Why is it the best? Because it allows the analyst to identify “an investment operation”… ”which, upon thorough analysis, promises safety of principle and satisfactory returns” p109 (and this philosophy is applicable irrespective of macro factors).

Question 3: Which parts of his approach do you think you want to imitate? Which ones do you think you would rather not? Why? (we will revisit this at the end of the book)

All of it and especially to better determine investment from speculation and to avoid speculation.

Question 4: What’s the difference between an investment and a speculation? Why did Graham choose the words that he did to define it, and what are the implications of his choices for investing?

“an investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis, promises safety of principle and satisfactory returns. Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative” p109

The implications are that no one enterprise or issue will always be investment grade and without thorough, ongoing analysis and considering price, the analyst/investor may not realise the investment is actually a speculation instead.

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